Robert Norman, Sr. and Diane Norman v. Mark E. Arnold and Norman M. Larson : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Robert Norman, Sr. and Diane Norman v. Mark E.
Arnold and Norman M. Larson : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steve Russell; Grand County Law and Justice Center; attorney for appellants.
Matthew L. Lalli; Amy F. Sorenson; Snell and Wilmer, LLP; James C. Haskins, attorneys for
appellees.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Norman v. Arnold, No. 20010134.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1772
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M 
LARSON, 
Defendants/ Appellees. 
Case No. 20010134-SC 
Priority No. 15 
Oral Argument Requested 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE MARK E. ARNOLD 
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT 
COURT, GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON 
Steve Russell, Esq. 
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, UT 84532 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Robert Norman, Sr., and Diane Norman 
James C. Haskins, Esq. 
Haskins & Associates, P.C. 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Norman M. Larson 
Matthew L.Lalli (#6105) 
Amy F. Sorenson (#8947) 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Mark E. Arnold 
Fl L E D 
JUN 1 5 2001 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE 
NORMAN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M. 
LARSON, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 20010134-SC 
Priority No. 15 
Oral Argument Requested 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE MARK E. ARNOLD 
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT 
COURT, GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON 
Matthew L.Lalli (#6105) 
Amy F. Sorenson (#8947) 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Mark E. Arnold 
Steve Russell, Esq. 
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC 
729 Bartlett Circle 
Moab, UT 84532 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Robert Norman, Sr., and Diane Norman 
James C. Haskins, Esq. 
Haskins & Associates, P.C. 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Norman M. Larson 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 9 
A. BACKGROUND 9 
B. THE NORMANS DID NOT CONSENT TO ARNOLD'S 
ADMISSION AS A PARTNER 11 
C. ARNOLD WAS NOT THE NORMANS' LAWYER 12 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 16 
ARGUMENT 18 
A. THE NORMANS' STATEMENT OF FACTS DOES NOT 
COMPLY WITH UTAH RULE OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE 24 18 
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE 
NORMANS' CONTRACT CLAIM AGAINST ARNOLD FOR 
BREACH OF THE JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT 19 
C. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE 
NORMANS' CLAIM AGAINST ARNOLD FOR BREACH OF 
THE TRUST DEED NOTE 22 
D. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE 
NORMANS' CLAIM AGAINST ARNOLD FOR BREACH OF 
FIDUCIARY DUTY 25 
1. ARNOLD DID NOT OWE THE NORMANS A 
FIDUCIARY DUTY BECAUSE HE WAS NOT THEIR 
LAWYER 25 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(continued) 
Page 
2. THE MARGULIES CASE CANNOT REASONABLY BE 
SAID TO IMPOSE ON ARNOLD SEPARATE DUTIES 
TO BOTH THE PARTNERSHIP AND THE NORMANS 26 
E. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE 
NORMANS' CLAIM AGAINST ARNOLD FOR PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES 30 
F. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING THE NORMANS' POST-TRIAL MOTIONS FOR 
LEAVE TO AMEND 32 
CONCLUSION 35 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE MARK ARNOLD 
Deposition of Diane Norman. March 30, 2000 
R. 426-34 TAB1 
Deposition of Robert Norman, Sr. March 30, 2000 
R. 436-60 TAB 2 
Deposition of Robert Norman, Sr. August 25,1999 
R. 482-87 TAB 3 
South Eastern Utah Title Company Closing Statement. May 22,1998 
R. 489-93 TAB 4 
Transcript of Videotape-Recorded Hearing Held August 28, 2000 
R. 1432 TAB 5 
-li-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962) 19 
Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 3, 33, 35 
Collett v.Goodrich, 231 P.2d730, 733 (Utah 1951) 3, 22 
DCR. Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983) 32 
Estate of Justheim v. Ebert, 824 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 22 
Folsom v. Fernstrom, 134 P. 1021, 1024 (Utah 1913) 20,21 
Gerbich v. Numed. Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1999) 21 
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983), overruled on other 
grounds by Meadowbrook v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 119 (Utah 1998) 33 
Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 750 (Utah 
1982) 31,32 
Hopper v.Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994) 27 
In re General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water, 
982 P.2d 65, 69 (Utah 1999) 1, 2, 3 
Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co.. 660 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1983) 31 
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) 25,26 
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) 19 
Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985) 26, 28, 29, 30 
Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co.. 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 
(Utah 1983) 33 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Continued 
State v. Jiron, 866 P.2d 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 19 
Vasels v. LoGuidice. 740 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 19 
Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360,1363 (Utah 1986) 4 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §48-1-15(7) 3,20,21 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)0) 3,20,21 
RULES 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(7) 18 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) 4 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 1 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 1 
TREATISES 
59A Am.Jur.2d § 109, PARTNERSHIP 20 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 24.8 (4th ed. 1996) 27 
JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from two judgments in a civil case entered pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson of the Seventh Judicial 
District Court in and for Moab County, Utah entered the first judgment dismissing the 
third and fourth causes of action in the complaint on August 15, 2000, and entered the 
second judgment dismissing the remaining two causes of action on January 18, 2001. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-
2(3)0) (2000). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. On a motion for summary judgment, was the trial court correct in 
concluding that defendant-appellee Mark Arnold ("Arnold") did not owe plaintiffs-
appellants Robert and Diane Norman (the "Normans") any duty under a March 15, 1995 
joint venture agreement as a matter of law because of the undisputed facts that Arnold 
was not a signatory to the joint venture agreement and, by the Normans' own admission, 
did not become a partner in the joint venture because the partners never consented to his 
admission as a partner? On appeal, "[b]ecause a summary judgment presents questions 
of law," the appellate court reviews the trial court's ruling for "correctness." In re 
General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water, 982 P.2d 65, 69 (Utah 
1999) (citations omitted). "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [the appellate 
court] determine[s] only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and 
whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact." 
Id. (citations omitted). 
B. On the same motion for summary judgment, was the trial court correct in 
concluding as a matter of law that Arnold did not owe the Normans a duty under a June 
1995 trust deed note - signed only by the Normans, their joint venture partners, and 
defendant-appellee Norman Larson ("Larson") - because of the undisputed fact that 
Arnold was not a party to that note? On appeal, "[bjecause a summary judgment presents 
questions of law," the appellate court reviews the trial court's ruling for "correctness." In 
re General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water, 982 P.2d 65, 69 
(Utah 1999) (citations omitted). "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [the 
appellate court] determine^] only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing 
law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact." Id (citations omitted). 
C. On a previous motion for partial summary judgment, did the trial court 
correctly conclude that Arnold did not owe the Normans a fiduciary duty because of the 
undisputed facts, including the Normans' admission under oath, that Arnold was "never" 
their lawyer, but instead was the lawyer for the joint venture partnership? Again, on 
appeal, "[bjecause a summary judgment presents questions of law," the appellate court 
reviews the trial court's ruling for "correctness." In re General Determination of the 
Rights to the Use of All the Water, 982 P 2d 65, 69 (Utah 1999) (citations omitted). "In 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [the appellate court] determine[s] only whether 
the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly 
held that there were no disputed issues of material fact." Icl (citations omitted). 
D. On the same motion for partial summary judgment, was the trial court 
correct in dismissing the Normans' claim for punitive damages after dismissing their 
fiduciary duty claim as a matter of law, where both of the only two remaining causes of 
action in their complaint were contract claims? "Because a summary judgment presents 
questions of law," the appellate court reviews the trial court's ruling for "correctness." In 
re General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water, 982 P.2d 65, 69 
(Utah 1999) (citations omitted). "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [the 
appellate court] determine^] only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing 
law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact." Id. (citations omitted). 
E. Finally, was the trial court within its discretion in denying the Normans 
leave to amend their complaint, when the motion to amend was submitted after the first 
day of trial and after Arnold and Larson had spent significant time and money in reliance 
on the allegations in the Normans' amended complaint? Leave to amend a pleading is 
within the "broad discretion" of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent 
"an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice." Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted).1 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The determinative statute at issue here is Utah Code Annotated § 48-1-15(7), 
which provides that "[t]the rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership 
shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules . . . 
[n]o person can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all the 
partners." Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-15(7) (2000).2 
1
 The Normans also seek to have this Court review the alleged decision of the trial court 
not "to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the defendants to prohibit them 
from denying that they had become partners in a joint venture to develop a hotel on [the 
Normans'] property." (Appellants' Br. at 4.) As will be shown in detail below, this issue 
was never pled nor briefed and therefore should not be considered on appeal. Collett v. 
Goodrich, 231 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1951). 
2
 In the corresponding portion of the Normans' brief, they argue that "[t]he trial court 
made no factual findings" in connection with the parties' motions for summary judgment 
and imply that this should affect this Court's analysis in some unstated fashion. 
(Appellants' Br. at 5.) However, "[f]indings of fact and conclusions of law are 
unnecessary" in connection with summary judgment decisions. Weber v. Springville 
City, 725 P.2d 1360,1363 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit is about a real estate joint venture that failed. The aim of the joint 
venture was to develop a Holiday Inn motel in Moab, Utah. Its members were both 
Robert and Diane Norman, Duane Barney, Pete Lanto, and Greg Page.3 As set forth in 
their March 15, 1995 joint venture agreement, each of these individuals had a particular 
role to play. (R. 373.) The Normans were to donate the real property, Page was to 
arrange for financing, Lanto was to construct the Holiday Inn, and Barney was to oversee 
the operation and management of the Holiday Inn once construction was complete. (Id.) 
Page hired Larson to assist the joint venture in obtaining financing. (R. 374.) Arnold, an 
attorney, become involved only after the joint venture had been formed and was 
contacted by Larson concerning real estate and land use issues. (R. 365; R. 450-51.) 
After the joint venture failed for lack of financing, on September 18, 1998, the 
Normans filed suit against their joint venture partners - Page, Barney, Lanto, and 
Rasmussen - as well as against Arnold and Larson, for breach of the joint venture 
agreement, for default on the promissory note, and for punitive damages, styled as a 
separate cause of action. (R. 1-30.) On November 3, 1999, and after deposing Arnold 
and Larson, the Normans chose to file an amended complaint dismissing all of their joint 
venture partners, retaining only the outsiders, Arnold and Larson. (R. 194-208.) Counsel 
for the Normans has stated that he chose to dismiss the two critical members of the joint 
venture, Page and Barney, upon learning that both had filed bankruptcy after the 
Normans initiated their lawsuit. (R. 125-26.) The Normans also dismissed Lanto at the 
same time based on their understanding that Lanto had sold his interest in the joint 
3
 Greg Page's brother-in-law, Eric Rasmussen, signed the joint venture agreement on 
Page's behalf, although the Normans acknowledge that Page was the real joint venture 
partner. (R. 195.) 
venture to Arnold and Western Empire Advisors, Larson's company. (R. 126; R. 1432: 
68:22-25.) 
In their amended complaint, the Normans retained their three original claims for 
"Breach of Joint Venture Agreement," "Default of Trust Deed Note," and punitive 
damages, and added only a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Arnold. (R. 194-
208.) The Normans made this choice, despite the facts that they signed the joint venture 
agreement, agreed to contribute their property to the joint venture, and signed the 
promissory note to the Youngs without so much as meeting Arnold, and despite the fact 
that neither Arnold nor Larson had signed the joint venture agreement with the Normans 
and the joint venture partners. (R. 12-18; R. 425-26; R. 449-50.) 
After retaining counsel in early 2000, Arnold took the depositions of both Robert 
and Diane Norman on March 30, 2000. (R. 368-89; Exs. 3 & 4.) During those 
depositions, relevant portions of which are set forth below, the Normans repeatedly and 
unequivocally testified that they "never" retained Arnold as their lawyer and, further, that 
they "never" consented to admit Arnold as a partner in the joint venture. (R. 376-77.) 
Based on this testimony and the undisputed facts, Arnold filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment on May 31, 2000. (R. 361-493.) In his motion, Arnold argued that 
(1) he did not sign the joint venture agreement, nor could he have become a joint venture 
partner as a matter of law, precluding him from any liability on the Normans' first cause 
of action for breach of the joint venture agreement; (2) the Normans repeatedly and 
unequivocally testified that Arnold was "never" the Normans' lawyer, and therefore he 
could not owe them a fiduciary duty as a matter of law; and (3) because the only 
remaining claim in the Normans' complaint - the second cause of action for "Default of 
Trust Deed Note" - sounded in contract, the Normans were not entitled to punitive 
damages a matter of law. (R. 380-88.) 
At oral argument on August 2, 2001, the trial court granted Arnold's motion on the 
Normans' breach of fiduciary duty claim on the ground that Arnold's representation of 
the joint venture did not give rise to a fiduciary duty to the Normans individually as a 
matter of law. (R. 1429: 53:15-25; R. 780, % 2.) To rule otherwise, the court found, 
would "mean[ ] that every lawyer that represented a joint venture would, by that very act, 
have an inherent conflict of interest." (R. 1429: 53:23-25.) The court also dismissed the 
Normans' fourth claim for punitive damages because only "contractual claims" remained 
in their complaint, "and you don't get punitive damages as a matter of law on a 
contractual claim." (R. 1429: 54:19-21; R. 780, p . ) Finally, the court denied Arnold's 
motion on the Normans' claim for breach of the joint venture agreement. (R. 779-80, % 
1.) In so doing, the court acknowledged that "if one doesn't agree to being a partner with 
someone, no partnership can exist with that person," but was persuaded at that time that 
there may be a factual issue about whether or not the Normans may have effectively 
consented to Arnold's admission to the joint venture through their conduct. (R. 1429: 
44:2-20.) 
After spending the next few weeks preparing, the parties appeared for the jury trial 
of the Normans' claims for breach of the joint venture agreement and default of the trust 
deed note on August 28, 2000. (R. 1432.) After swearing the jury, the trial court was 
forced to declare a mistrial because one of the empaneled jurors revealed that he had 
failed to inform the court that he had been convicted of a felony. (R. 1432; 31:9; 35:6-
36:12; 44:3.) Due to the court's schedule, trial was not able to be rescheduled until 
January 16 through 19, 2001. (R. 963.) In September, 2000, the Normans filed a 
"Motion to File 2nd Amended Complaint," proposing to add claims for (1) "liability 
under the joint venture agreement," apparently a claim for a partial accounting for their 
claimed personal loss of $212,000 to retire the promissory note; (2) "liability under the 
trust deed note," an action for contribution from their co-obligors on the note, and from 
Arnold; and (3) for breach of Arnold's fiduciary duties to the joint venture. (R. 973-978; 
985-87.) 
Arnold opposed the Normans' motion on the grounds that the proposed 
amendments were untimely, prejudicial, futile, and offered without explanation for their 
delay. (R. 983-99.) The Normans responded to this opposition with a second motion, "to 
further amend." This time, the Normans sought leave to amend their complaint to 
include claims for (1) "Individual Liability for Losses Incurred by the Business Venture," 
alleging for the first time that the joint venture had been "dissolved" if it indeed "ever 
existed in reality"; and (2) a claim against both Arnold and Larson for "professional 
liability" to the joint venture. (R. 1030-31.) Arnold incorporated his arguments in 
opposition to the Normans' first post-trial motion to amend, and further observed that 
both of the Normans' new proposed claims were likewise futile. (R. 1030-32.) 
The trial court denied both motions at oral argument. (R. 1430: 51:7-10.) In so 
doing, the court found that the motions were made "very late in the process," that the 
"facts were known earlier than right at trial," and that the defendants would incur 
additional expense as the result of the new claims. (R. 1430: 48:17-49:5.) The trial 
court also expressed "real doubt" about the proposed claims' viability. (R. 1430: 49:6-
10.) Counsel for the Normans previously admitted the inadequacy of their complaint as it 
existed on the first day of trial: "The pleadings, I'll tell you quite frankly, don't go to the 
case. . . ." (R. 1432: 67:11-12.) During the hearing on the Normans' motions to amend, 
the Normans' counsel further acknowledged that, unless the trial court allowed them 
leave to amend, it was likely that the parties and the court would be "wasting [their] time 
having a trial." (R. 1430: 47:5-12.) 
Subsequently, on December 13, 2000, Arnold moved for summary judgment on 
the Normans' two remaining causes of action. (R. 1304-93.) Arnold again argued that 
the Normans' unequivocal testimony established that they "never" consented to Arnold's 
admission to the joint venture, and further argued that the Normans had adduced no 
evidence that any of the joint venture partners had consented to Arnold's admission 
either. (R. 1311.) On the Normans' second claim, for default of trust deed note, Arnold 
argued that he was not a signatory to the note, and that the October 27, 1995 purchase 
agreement with Lanto created, at most, an obligation to Lanto, not to the Normans. (R. 
1312-14.) After hearing on Arnold's motion, as well as on a motion for summary 
judgment filed by Larson and on a cross-motion for summary judgment by the Normans, 
the court stated that although he had previously denied summary judgment on the 
Normans' first cause of action on the ground that there could be some evidence of 
consent through conduct, the court had "now become a little more familiar with this case, 
and [ ] notice[d] that Mr. Norman, from the very beginning, has alleged the lack of 
consent to their entry into the joint venture." (R. 1431: 66:3-8.) 
The court further found it "abundantly clear . . . that Arnold never signed the note 
and he never . . . agreed with the other makers of the promissory note to assume the 
responsibilities that Lanto had under that agreement." (R. 1431: 67:19-23.) This appeal 
followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. BACKGROUND, 
1. On March 15, 1995, the Normans, Barney, Lanto, and Rasmussen executed 
a document entitled "Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement," thus forming a 
joint venture partnership with the purpose of developing a Holiday Inn Express in Moab, 
Utah. (R. 194-208.) 
2. The members of "the group," the original joint venture partners, were 
Robert and Diane Norman, Duane Barney, Pete Lanto, and Greg Page. (R. 417.) 
3. Each of these individuals had "a different role" to play. (R. 419.) The 
Normans were to donate the real property, Page was to "arrange for financing," Lanto 
was to construct the Holiday Inn, and Barney was to oversee the "operation and 
management" of the Holiday Inn once construction was complete. (R. 419-21.) 
4. Page hired Norman Larson to assist in obtaining financing. Larson in turn 
introduced the joint venture partners to Mark Arnold, who became the real estate and 
land use lawyer for the joint venture. (R. 365.) The first step toward development was to 
obtain short-term financing to purchase two things: the Holiday Inn Franchise for 
$40,000 and another larger sum of money to cover miscellaneous up-front costs and to 
use as seed money to obtain a construction loan. (R. 429-30; R. 453.) At the requests of 
Larson and the joint venture members, Arnold introduced the joint venture partners to 
Ann and Norman Young, who later agreed to provide this short-term financing. (R. 365; 
R. 444.) 
5. In June of 1995, the Youngs agreed to make a short-term loan for $160,000, 
payable in 90 days, at 18 percent interest and with loan fees totaling 12 points. (R. 365.) 
6. The Normans, Page, Barney, Lanto, and Larson all signed the promissory 
note; Arnold did not. (R. 218; R. 462-64.) 
7. The joint venture partners - and the Normans in particular - agreed to 
pledge the Normans' property as collateral for the loan, and the Normans signed a deed 
of trust in the Youngs' favor. (R. 365.) The loan proceeds were placed into a trust 
account owned by Larson, and Larson was the only person with signature authority. (Id.) 
8. On October 27, 1995, pursuant to a "Purchase Agreement," Lanto 
purported to sell his interest in the joint venture to Mark Arnold and Western Empire 
Advisors, a company owned by Larson, for $8,500. (R. 454-56.) The purchase 
agreement does not mention or identify the Normans in any way. (R. 477.) 
9. The purchase agreement defines "Purchaser" as Arnold and Western 
Empire Advisors, and further provides that "[i]n consideration of Seller selling his 
interest, Purchaser agrees to hold Seller harmless from any and all claims arising out of 
the development of [the Moab Holiday Inn project], including but not limited to tort 
claims and claims on any notes for moneys previously borrowed totaling $160,000." (R. 
477.) 
10. Larson obtained the Holiday Inn franchise and over the next year Page and 
Larson attempted to obtain permanent financing, but to no avail. (R. 485; R. 366.) 
Although Arnold persuaded the Youngs to extend the promissory note several times, 
when Larson's financing efforts failed, foreclosure on the note seemed imminent. (R. 
366; R. 433.) 
11. In an effort to help the joint venture avoid foreclosure, Arnold introduced 
them to Jim Winkler, who purchased the property from the Normans and paid off the 
Young note. (R. 366; R. 457-59.) At the closing on Winkler's purchase, $212,000 of the 
sales proceeds were paid to the Youngs for release of their trust deed. (R. 366.) The 
balance of the sales proceeds were paid to the Normans. (R. 489.) 
B. THE NORMANS DID NOT CONSENT TO ARNOLD'S ADMISSION 
AS A PARTNER, 
12. The joint venture agreement provided that "[additional Joint Venturers 
may be added to the Joint Venture at any time upon agreement of all of the then existing 
Joint Venturers" (R. 406.) (emphasis added). 
13. Mr. Norman has twice testified that "[n]obody asked [him] about'' Arnold 
becoming a member of the joint venture, and that he never consented to Arnold's 
admission: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli]. . . . You never gave your consent for 
Mark Arnold to become an owner in the hotel part? 
A: [By Mr. Norman] Nobody asked me about that. 
Q: Okay. So because nobody asked you, you therefore never 
consented, right? 
A: Right. 
(R. 457.) 
Q: [By Mr. Howe] Did you ever give your consent for any 
other individual to become a member of the joint venture? 
A: [By Mr. Norman]. . . . The answer is no. 
(R. 483-84.) 
14. Diane Norman also testified that she "never" consented to Arnold 
becoming a joint venture partner. 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli]. . . . Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold 
becoming a partner? 
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Never. 
Q: Okay. Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold purchasing 
Lanto's interest? 
A: Never. 
(R. 434.) 
C. ARNOLD WAS NOT THE NORMANS' LAWYER, 
15. Both Robert and Diane Noiman repeatedly have testified that Arnold was 
"the lawyer for the group," not for the Normans themselves: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli]. . . . You believed that Arnold was just the 
lawyer for the entire group? 
A: [By Mr. Norman] That's right. That's the only contact I 
h a d . . . . 
Q: In the event that your interests became different from say 
Page or Barney, did you believe that Arnold would then 
represent your interests rather than Page or Barney's? 
A: No, I was just - as the group is the only thing. 
Q: Did you think about whether Mr. Arnold would look out 
for your interests rather than Page or Barney's in the event 
your interests became different from Page's and Barney's? 
A: I don't think it would be singled out - that I would be 
singled out as being shown any favor, it was strictly for the 
group, that's it. 
(R. 437-38; R. 443; R. 445-46.) 
16. Diane Norman further testified that Arnold "never" represented the 
Normans individually: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] . . . . You've told me that you believe that 
Arnold was the lawyer for the group; right? 
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Uh-huh. 
Q: [Arnold] represented the group, and do you know if he 
represented Page, Barney, or Lanto individually? 
A: No, I don't. 
Q: And he did not represent you individually? 
A: Never. 
(R. 417-18.) 
17. In fact, the Normans' "principal contact" for information about the joint 
venture was Page, not Arnold: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Well, within the group, isn't it true that 
each member had different responsibilities? 
A: [By Mr. Norman] I assume that, but I - the main contacts 
I had was with Duane Barney and Greg Page, and primarily 
Greg Page was the principal individual that was giving me 
answers when he was available to give answers. 
Q: And wasn't Greg Page's primary responsibility to get 
financing for the project? 
A: I can't single him out as being the one that's responsible 
for the financing when the whole group was involved, they 
each had jobs to do, but Greg Page was my principal contact. 
(R. 441.) 
18. Similarly, the Normans testified that Page, or Page and Barney, were the 
joint venture partners solely responsible for communicating with Arnold about the joint 
venture's representation: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Was there one member of the group whose 
responsibility it was to interact with Mark Arnold? 
A: [By Mr. Norman] Greg Page I would say would be the 
lead individual that we would try to get ahold of. 
Q: Okay. 
A: And Duane Barney. 
Q: And during this period of the intended development, was 
it your understanding that Page and Barney were Mark 
Arnold's contacts with the group? 
A: That was my understanding. 
(R. 442-43.) 
19. Diane Norman also had the "expectation" that Page and Barney would 
make and receive communications with Arnold on behalf of the joint venture. 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Did you expect that Page and Barney 
would be the ones who would communicate with the group's 
lawyer? 
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Yes, and with the financial people and 
whoever. 
Q: . . . . Was it your expectation that whatever legal work 
needed to be done, Page and Barney would communicate it to 
Arnold on behalf of the group? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And was it also your expectation that the communication 
would flow back the same way? 
A: Yes. 
Q: That is if Arnold is the group's lawyer and had 
information to communicate to the group, he would tell Page 
and Barney? 
A: Right. 
(R. 422-23.) 
20. Diane Norman further testified that it was reasonable for Arnold, as the 
group's attorney, to communicate with Page and Barney as representatives of the joint 
venture: 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Well, and I think you just told me that it 
was your expectation that if the group's attorney wanted to 
communicate with the group, he would have done so through 
Page and Barney; right? 
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Yeah, he's not going to call all of us 
to say -
Q: Right. And you think that's reasonable? 
A: I think that's reasonable as a group attorney. 
(R. 424.) 
21. The Normans further testified that they spoke with two attorneys of then-
own, "Mr. McConkey" [sic] and Mr. Hughes, for advice and counsel in their individual 
behalf during the joint venture's existence. (R. 446-48.) When the Normans wanted 
representation "personally" during this time frame, they retained counsel of their own. 
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Would you say that you hired Mr. 
McConkey to be your lawyer? 
A: [By Mr. Norman] Yes, sir. 
Q: And when you're talking about your lawyer, are you 
talking about Bob Norman personally or a lawyer for the 
group? 
A: No, personally, to find out why we weren't getting any 
answers from the group. 
(R. 448.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In their appeal brief, like the many briefs they filed in response to motions for 
summary judgment, motions in limine, and motions to amend, the Normans angrily 
accuse Arnold of various breaches that allegedly caused them to lose money. The facts 
on which these alleged breaches are based, of course, are highly disputed and therefore 
irrelevant to review of motions for summary judgment. Only the undisputed facts can 
and should be considered. These undisputed facts demonstrate, as a matter of law, the 
common flaw running through all four of the Norman's claims against Arnold: the utter 
absence of any duty owed by Arnold to the Normans individually. 
Arnold owed the Normans no duty under the joint venture agreement, which the 
Normans claim he breached in their first cause of action. It is undisputed that Arnold 
never signed that agreement and never assented to its terms. Moreover, Arnold did not 
become bound by that agreement indirectly, as the Normans contend, by becoming a 
partner in the joint venture several months after the agreement originally was signed. 
The plain language of the joint venture agreement, as well as Utah statute and case law, 
provide that Arnold could not become a partner in the joint venture without the 
unanimous consent of all of the existing partners. It is undisputed - because the Normans 
so testified - that they "never" consented to admit Arnold as a partner. And there is 
absolutely no evidence that any of the other partners - Page, Barney, and Lanto - gave 
their consent either. 
Arnold owed the Normans no duty under the "Trust Deed Note," which the 
Normans claim Arnold breached as well. The note in question was executed by six co-
obligors - Robert Norman, Diane Norman, Page, Barney, Lanto, and Larson - in favor of 
the Youngs, who loaned $160,000 to the joint venture. Arnold is not a signator on that 
note. Moreover, by signing the so-called Lanto purchase agreement, Arnold at most 
agreed to partially indemnify Lanto for any obligation Lanto had under the note. But 
Arnold did not agree to become a co-obligor on the note, or to pay anything to the 
Normans. 
Arnold owed the Normans no fiduciary duty as their lawyer, because the Normans 
unequivocally admit that Arnold never was their lawyer. It is undisputed that Arnold, at 
most, was the lawyer for the joint venture. As such, his duties ran to the joint venture, 
not to the individual joint venture partners. Contrary to the Normans' new contention, 
this Court's opinion in Margulies v. Upchurch, infra, does not impose on Arnold any 
duties to the Normans individually for at least three reasons: (1) the nature of Arnold's 
representation was to provide real estate and land use advice to facilitate the development 
of a Holiday Inn motel, it was not to protect the Normans' property against foreclosure; 
(2) in Margulies, the individual partners testified that they believed the law firm 
represented them individually, which is the exact opposite of what the Normans testified; 
and (3) as a matter of policy, if a lawyer owed individual duties to all partners who 
contributed personal property to a joint venture and therefore risked losing it, the inherent 
conflicts of interests among the partnership and the various partners would prevent a 
lawyer from ever representing the partnership. 
Because Arnold owed no fiduciary duty to the Normans, the trial court 
appropriately ruled that the Normans' claim for punitive damages must fail. Similarly, 
because the Normans had ample time and opportunity to seek to amend their complaint 
before the first day of trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to 
amend. 
In sum, it is undeniably unfortunate that the Normans entered into a joint venture 
that failed, and that they lost part of the value of their property in the process. But, as the 
trial court explained, the Normans made their investment decision and assumed the 
accompanying risks before they ever even met Arnold: 
But your client made an agreement, at the very start of all 
this, where he was going to put up eight acres of land for a 
joint venture. And the other people were only putting up 
experience. If he had come to me and I had reviewed that 
with him, I'd have said, Bob, do you understand that these 
people are putting up nothing and you're putting up eight 
acres of land? If this thing goes belly up, you lose your land, 
they lose nothing. That's what I'd have said to him, if he'd 
have come to me to look at this. Isn't that what he bought 
into from the very beginning, that he would - he was possible 
[sic] going to lose all of his land? 
(R. 1431: 45:19-46:5.) 
In short, the Normans' disappointments are not - and could not legally be -
Arnold's fault. Arnold never owed them a duty. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE NORMANS1 STATEMENT OF FACTS DOES NOT COMPLY 
WITH UTAH RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 24, 
This Court can dismiss the Norman's appeal on procedural grounds for failure to 
properly set forth a concise statement of facts under Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Rather than setting forth the relevant facts on which they will rely 
in the six sections of argument which follow, the Normans claim that because "[a]n 
extensive factual record was established in the parties' various motions for and responses 
to motions for summary judgment," they are therefore relieved from doing so. 
(Appellants' Br. at 7.) Instead, "[r]ather than reproduce all that here," the Normans 
would prefer to "include[ ] [that factual record] in the Addendum with appropriate 
references throughout the brief." (Id.) 
Because the Normans have "fail[ed] to make a concise statement of the facts and 
citation of the pages in the record where those facts are supported" as required, this Court 
should "assume the correctness of the judgment below." Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of 
California. 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (disregarding appellant's brief on 
appeal sua sponte for failure to cite to the record); see also State v. Jiron, 866 P.2d 1249 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (granting motion to strike appellant's brief because "it is improper 
to use an addendum to incorporate argument by reference that should be included in the 
body of the brief.") 
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE NORMANS9 
CONTRACT CLAIM AGAINST ARNOLD FOR BREACH OF THE 
JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT. 
In their first cause of action, "Breach of Joint Venture Agreement," the Normans 
alleged that Arnold breached the joint venture agreement in a number of ways. (R. 200-
01.) Of course, as a necessary predicate to establishing liability for breach of this 
agreement, the Normans first were required to prove that Arnold became a party to it and 
voluntarily assumed the rights and obligations thereunder. See, ej*., Vasels v. 
LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (observing that mutual assent of 
parties to a contract is "essential" to create binding contract); Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 
597, 600 (Utah 1962) ("[a] binding contract can only exist where there has been mutual 
assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms.") As the trial 
court correctly found, the undisputed facts negate this fundamental element of the 
Normans' breach of contract claim. 
It is undisputed that Arnold never signed the joint venture agreement nor assented 
to its terms. The face of the joint venture agreement itself conclusively demonstrates that 
Arnold is not a signatory. (R. 12-18.) Because Arnold obviously is not a party to the 
joint venture agreement, the Normans attempted to bind him to that agreement by 
alleging that he became a joint venture partner and thereby assumed obligations under the 
joint venture agreement indirectly. The Normans do not now and have not ever cited any 
law in support of this argument. (Appellants' Br. at 26-29.) Even if such a proposition 
were legally correct, however, it is undisputed that Arnold never became a partner in the 
joint venture. 
Under the plain language of the joint venture agreement and the law, Arnold could 
not become a partner in the joint venture without the unanimous consent of the existing 
partners. Furthermore, the joint venture agreement itself specifically provides that 
"[additional Joint Venturers may be added to the Joint Venture at any time upon 
agreement of all of the then existing Joint Venturers" (R. 12, Article 1.7) (emphasis 
added.) The Utah Code provides that "subject to any agreement between them . . . [n]o 
person can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all the partners." 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-15(7); see also 59A Am.Jur.2d § 109, PARTNERSHIP ("[N]o 
person can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all partners.") In 
Folsom v. Fernstrom, 134 P. 1021, 1024 (Utah 1913), this Court also upheld a verdict for 
the plaintiff, finding that the defendant had not become a member of the plaintiffs failed 
real estate partnership because there was insufficient evidence that the plaintiff had 
consented to the defendant's admission to the partnership. In so holding, the Court 
observed that "[o]f course [defendant] could not become a member of the pcLrtnership 
without the consent of both [the plaintiff] and [the co-defendant], the original members of 
the firm." Folsom, 134 P. at 1024. 
Applying this law to the undisputed facts, the trial court correctly found that there 
was not any consent - let alone unanimous consent - to admit Arnold to the partnership. 
The Normans themselves expressly denied such consent. Robert Norman has twice 
testified that "[n]obody asked [him] about" Arnold becoming a member of the joint 
venture, and, without explanation or qualification of any kind, agrees that he never 
consented to Arnold's admission. (R. 457.) Diane Norman testified equally definitively 
that she "never" consented to Arnold's admission as a joint venture partner. (R. 434.) 
Indeed, the Normans' amended complaint specifically states that if Arnold became a joint 
venture partner, he somehow did so "contrary to [the joint venture agreement's] 
provisions" - the provision requiring unanimous consent for the admission of a new 
partner. (R. 201.) 
Even if the Court were to disregard the Normans' sworn testimony on this point, 
the Normans have adduced no evidence whatsoever that Barney, Page, and Lanto each 
consented to Arnold's admission to the partnership, which the specific provisions of the 
joint venture agreement and Utah common and statutory law require. Utah Code Ann. § 
48-1-15(7); Folsom v. Fernstronu 134 P. 1021, 1024 (Utah 1913). The Normans did not 
submit a single affidavit from any of their joint venture partners on this (or, for that 
matter, on any) point, nor did they depose anyone in this case other Arnold and Larson. 
The Normans' complete failure to discover and submit such evidence below is a failure to 
discharge their burden in opposing Arnold's motion for summary judgment, and the trial 
court's decision should be upheld on this basis as well. Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 
1205, 1207 (Utah 1999) (upholding trial court's grant of summary judgment against 
plaintiff and stating that "[o]nce the allegations in the complaint are challenged . . . [the 
plaintiff] had the obligation to come forward with sufficient proof to show that she was 
entitled to proceed to trial.") Thus, the undisputed facts conclusively demonstrate that 
Arnold never became a joint venture partner, and therefore could not have become 
obligated on the joint venture agreement. 
Faced with the trial court's correct conclusions that Arnold never became a party 
to the joint venture agreement or a partner in the joint venture, the Normans now argue 
for the first time that this Court should nevertheless "equitably estop" Arnold from 
denying that he was a joint venture partner. (Appellants' Br. at 28-29.) In support of this 
new argument, the Normans recite a litany of highly disputed facts, each of which is 
irrelevant to establishing their breach of contract claim. (Id.) Even assuming, however, 
that "estopping" Arnold from denying partnership somehow could render him liable to 
the Normans for their breach of contract claim, the Normans admit that they did not plead 
equitable estoppel in the trial court, despite amending their complaint once after deposing 
Arnold and Larson, and seeking leave to amend the complaint two additional times after 
the date of trial. (R. 1431, 39:5-10; R. 194-208; R. 973-78, R. 1000-09; R. 1022-25.) 
Under Utah law, "[ejstoppel must be pleaded or it is waived." Estate of Justheim v. 
Ebert 824 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Collett v. Goodrich, 231 P.2d 730, 733 
(Utah 1951) ("[T]he majority view requires a party who has the opportunity to do so to 
specifically plead an equitable estoppel. Where the estoppel is not pleaded, it is 
inadmissible.") As a result, the Normans' "equitable estoppel" argument - neither 
pleaded nor briefed below - has not been preserved for appeal and should not be 
considered by this Court. Id. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE NORMANS' 
CLAIM AGAINST ARNOLD FOR BREACH OF THE TRUST DEED 
NOTE, 
In their second cause of action, for "Breach of Trust Deed Note," the Normans 
seek to hold Arnold liable to them under the June 1995 promissory note to the Youngs. 
Of course, it is undisputed that the promissory note was signed by Robert and Diane 
Norman, Page, Barney, Lanto, and Larson, as obligors. (R. 462-64.) The note is payable 
to the Youngs, who loaned the $160,000 to the joint venture. (Id.) Like the joint venture 
agreement, it is also undisputed that Arnold did not sign the promissory note, and 
therefore cannot be liable as a signatory. (R. 218; R. 462-64.) 
Acknowledging that Arnold is neither an obligor nor an obligee on the note, the 
Normans nonetheless claim that Arnold "should be held proportionately responsible for 
the losses incurred by the [Normans] under the Young Trust Deed Note." (Appellants' 
Br. at 30.) This claim is based on the fact that Arnold and Western Empire Advisors 
entered into the October 25, 1997 purchase agreement with Lanto four months after the 
note was made, under which they purported to indemnify Lanto for any liability he may 
have under the note. While it is true that Arnold did sign the October 27, 1995 
agreement, the trial court correctly found that Arnold was at least two steps removed 
from any liability to the Normans. 
First, the Lanto purchase agreement does not purport to make Arnold and Western 
Empire Advisors liable to anyone under the note. Rather, in exchange for $8,500.00, the 
purchase agreement states only that Arnold and Western Empire Advisors "agree to hold 
Seller [i.e., Lanto] harmless from any and all claims . . . on any notes for moneys 
previously borrowed totaling $160,000." (R. 477.) Finding that an indemnifier's 
obligation under the Lanto purchase agreement is far different from a payment obligation 
under the promissory note, the trial court explained: 
[A]t this point, it's abundantly clear to me that Arnold never 
signed the note and he never . . . agreed to step into the shoes, 
he never agreed with the other makers of the promissory note 
to assume the responsibilities that Lanto had under that 
agreement. And that agreement between Lanto and Arnold 
was not made to benefit the other makers of the promissory 
note, it was made to benefit Lanto. 
(R. 1431: 67:12-25.) In other words, if Lanto were ever found to be liable to the Youngs 
under the note, he may have a claim against Arnold and Western Empire Advisors for 
indemnification under the purchase agreement, but this would in no way create liability in 
Arnold to the Normans. 
Second, even if the Lanto purchase agreement somehow could render Arnold an 
obligor on a note he did not sign, any obligation Arnold assumed from Lanto under the 
promissory note ran to the Youngs as holders of the note, not to the Normans as co-
obligees on the note. Any given obligor on the note is liable to its holder, but nothing in 
the note renders the co-obligors "proportionately" liable to each other, as the Normans 
now contend. (Appellants' Br. at 30.) This is precisely the basis on which the trial court 
granted summary judgment to Larson, and it applies equally to Arnold. (R. 1416.) 
Specifically, the court found that 
There is no evidence about any intent on the part of the co-
makers of the promissory [note] that Mr. Larson was doing so 
in order to evidence his responsibility to them, and there is no 
reliable contemporaneous documentation or even testimony 
that Mr. Larson, by co-signing on a secured note, with ample 
security, was doing so for any other reason than to satisfy the 
lenders. 
(R. 1431: 68:10-16.) 
In short, by arguing to this Court that "Defendants should be held responsible for a 
proportionate share of the liability under the Young trust deed note," the Normans seek to 
have this Court rewrite their complaint, the note, and the law of Utah in this appeal. The 
trial court correctly found that Arnold cannot be liable on a note he did not sign, and 
cannot be liable to the Normans for a duty he undertook, if at all, to Lanto. The 
Normans' second cause of action for "Default of Trust Deed Note" was properly 
dismissed. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE NORMANS' 
CLAIM AGAINST ARNOLD FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY 
DUTY, 
In their third cause of action, the Normans claimed that Arnold owed and breached 
a fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty. (R. 224.) In their appellate brief, as in all of their 
memoranda and pleadings in the trial court, the Normans attempt to establish this 
fiduciary duty by citing highly disputed evidence of its breach. For example, they assert 
that "Arnold was engaged in gross self-dealing," and cite what they claim was "Arnold's 
almost inconceivable web of conflicting interests that were not disclosed to the 
plaintiffs." (Appellants' Br. at 22, 23.) This, of course, is circular reasoning. A duty 
cannot be created by its breach. Instead, in order to sustain a claim for a breach of 
fiduciary duty, the Normans first must establish that Arnold owed them a fiduciary duty. 
Based on the law and the undisputed facts, the trial court correctly concluded that Arnold 
did not owe the Normans a fiduciary duty. This is so for three reasons, explained below. 
1. Arnold Did Not Owe the Normans a Fiduciary Duty Because He 
Was Not Their Lawyer, 
Apart from the recitation of what they claim constituted the breach itself, the 
Normans contend the fiduciary duty arose here solely because Arnold provided legal 
services to the joint venture. Although it is true that a lawyer owes a fiduciary duty to his 
or her client, Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) it is undisputed that Arnold did not have an attorney-client relationship with them. 
Therefore, Arnold never owed the Normans a fiduciary duty. 
That Arnold never acted as the Normans' lawyer and thus never owed them a 
fiduciary duty is evident from the Normans' own testimony. Both of the Normans 
repeatedly have testified that (1) Arnold "never" acted as their lawyer (R. 418); (2) 
Arnold was at all times "the lawyer for the group," (R. 437-38; R. 445-46; R. 417); 
(3) Arnold's representation of the joint venture was "strictly for the group, that's it" in the 
event any of the individual joint venture partner's interests diverged (R. 438); and that (4) 
when the Normans wanted representation "personally" during the existence of the joint 
venture, they retained counsel of their own, Mr. McConkie. (R. 448.) 
Nor is there any evidence in the record to contradict this testimony. In fact, even 
Mr. Normans' affidavit, not submitted until the Normans' opposition to Larson's 
November 3, 2000 motion for summary judgment, confirms his previous, unequivocal 
testimony: "It was my understanding from the start that Mark Arnold was counsellor the 
joint ventured (R. 1167-1174, \ 14(a)) (emphasis added.) The Normans do not assert 
that Arnold ever acted as their attorney. Thus, their unequivocal testimony establishes 
that Arnold was not their lawyer, and because there was no attorney-client relationship, 
there was no fiduciary duty. See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 
1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (enumerating elements of cause of action for legal 
malpractice breach of fiduciary duty). 
2. The Margulies Case Cannot Reasonably Be Said to Impose On 
Arnold Separate Duties to Both the Partnership and the 
Normans, 
Despite the Normans' admission that Arnold was not their lawyer, the Normans 
claimed for the first time at the summary judgment hearing - and now in this appeal -
that this Court's decision in Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985), imposes 
on an attorney for a partnership separate fiduciary duties to each of the individual 
partners. Rejecting that argument, the trial court found that Margulies cannot reasonably 
be read to impose such broad and inherently conflicting fiduciary duties on attorneys for 
partnerships: 
I just don't think that a lawyer who represents a joint venture 
can be expected to, in addition to . . . advising the joint 
venture, advise each participant in the joint venture as to the 
particular relationships between that participant and each 
other participant in the joint venture. It means that every 
lawyer that represented a joint venture would, by that very 
act, have an inherent conflict of interest. 
(R. 1429: 53:17-25.) 
In fact, as the trial court correctly found, the general rule is that, as with the 
representation of corporations, "a lawyer who represents a partnership does not thereby 
become counsel for or owe a duty to the partners." Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. 
Smith, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 24.8 (4th ed. 1996). As Utah Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.13 further states, "[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization 
represents the organization acting through its duly retained constituents." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Applying this rule under analogous circumstances, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that the lawyer's duty was only to the partnership, not to the individual 
partners. Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). In Hopper, a general partner 
of a partnership sued the partnership's law firm for legal malpractice, but did so in his 
individual capacity. The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendant law 
firm because plaintiffs status as general partner of the law firm's client did not establish 
an attorney-client relationship between the law firm and the general partner as an 
individual. As a result, the court found that the plaintiff general partner lacked standing 
to sue for breach of fiduciary duty. In so holding, the court observed that mere "broad 
and conclusory assertion[s]" in the plaintiffs' affidavits stating that the law firm 
undertook an affirmative duty to represent plaintiffs separately from the partnership were 
"insufficient" to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an attorney-
client relationship. Here, as in Hopper, the Normans "fail[ed] to meet the burden of 
showing, through specific and pertinent facts, the existence of a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding the absence of an attorney-client relationship between [the law firm] and 
[the partners], as individuals . . . ." Hopper, 16 F.3d at 98. 
Contrary to the Normans' assertions, this Court's decision in Margulies does 
nothing to change this general rule. Indeed, the Court expressly stated: "It should be 
noted that we do not find that an attorney automatically becomes counsel for limited 
partners when he or she undertakes representation of a limited partnership . . . . [A]n 
attorney representing a corporation or similar entity owes allegiance to the entity rather 
than to its shareholders." Margulies, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200. Instead, Margulies merely 
adds two corollaries to this general proposition, neither of which Arnold disputes: (i) it is 
possible to have an implied, rather than an express, attorney-client relationship; and (ii) 
such an implied attorney-client relationship can arise with certain individual limited 
partners under facts and circumstances very different from those here. 
First, in Margulies, the law firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
("Jones, Waldo") represented a limited partnership in an action "aimed at preventing 
foreclosure on [ ] individual letters of credit" for which the limited partners were 
personally liable. 696 P.2d 1195, 1198. This Court agreed with the trial court's 
conclusion that "for all practical purposes, the [limited partners] are the parties in the 
Diversified litigation," and further reasoned that 
Jones, Waldo's successful representation of the limited 
partnership in Diversified would have protected the [limited 
partners] from substantial personal liability. Therefore, it was 
not at all unreasonable for the limited partners to believe that 
Jones, Waldo was acting for their individual interests as well 
as the interests of the partnership in that litigation. 
Id. at 1200. Thus, the express nature of the representation of the partnership was to 
protect the limited partners from the loss of their personal assets. 
Here, by contrast, Arnold was "counsel for the joint venture" by everyone's 
admission. (R. 1170, f^ 14(a); R. 417-18.) The purpose of Arnold's representation was to 
facilitate building a motel in Moab, not to protect the Normans' personal property. The 
Normans' deposition testimony makes clear that they stood to benefit nothing more from 
Arnold's representation of the partnership "than the incidental gain which will accrue to 
them as partners, and not in their individual capacities," which is exactly the 
circumstance under which the Margulies Court found that "no attorney client relationship 
should be implied." Id at 1201. 
Second, in the Margulies decision, distinctly unlike here, all three of the limited 
partners "attested that that [it] was their impression and belief that "Jones, Waldo was 
acting for their individual interests as well as the interests of the partnership in that 
litigation." Id. at 1200. In stark contrast, the Normans have testified that (1) in the event 
that any of the joint venture partners' interests diverged, Arnold was the lawyer "strictly 
for the group, that's it"; (2) that they relied on Page, not Arnold, as their "primary 
contact" for the joint venture; and that, (3) when they did feel that their personal interests 
were at stake, they consulted not one but two attorneys of their own, and hired Mr. 
McConkie to represent them. (R. 438, 441, 448.) Again, the Normans testified exactly 
the opposite of what the partners in Margulies testified; that is, that Arnold was not their 
lawyer. (R. 417-18; R. 437-38; R. 443; R. 445-46.) 
Third, the Margulies case analyzed the implied attorney-client relationship in the 
context of a motion to disqualify under the Rules of Professional Conduct, not in terms of 
legal malpractice liability. Central to the Court's decision was that Jones, Waldo had 
obtained personal financial information from the limited partners in the one litigation that 
had been sought in discovery and could be used against them in the other action. Id. at 
1199. In contrast, Arnold obtained no confidential information about the Normans or 
their finances that could have been or was used against them. 
Finally, the underlying policy of Margulies is that of avoiding conflicts of interest. 
But if the law is as the Normans contend, then every lawyer representing a partnership 
would owe individual duties to each partner, so long as any partner contributed 
something of value to the partnership that could be lost. Rather than avoiding conflicts of 
interest, this would create conflicts of interest, conflicts that effectively would prevent a 
lawyer from ever representing an entity for fear of violating his or her duties to its 
individual members. As the trial court observed, 
[H]ow is a lawyer going to know, representing an entity, 
when he has to consider the interest of each of the people who 
hold an investment in that entity? Has he got to go to each 
shareholder of a corporation and say, if you lose this 
investment, is your life going to be ruined? Does she have to 
go to the individual partners and say, are you individually 
liable here? It creates a real dilemma for lawyers 
(R. 1429;46:7-15.) 
Under the undisputed facts here, and in light of the complete opposite facts in 
Margulies, the trial court's decision dismissing the Normans' claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty as a matter of law was correct, and should be upheld. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE NORMANS' 
CLAIM AGAINST ARNOLD FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES, 
The Normans' fourth cause of action purported to set forth an independent claim 
for "Punitive Damages," alleging that "defendants knowingly and intentionally set out to 
take advantage of [the Normans] and use their property to secure funds which defendants 
would then use for their own purposes." (R. 206.) A claim for punitive damages, 
however, is not a cause of action in itself, but must be predicated on an independent tort. 
Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 750 (Utah 1982). With the trial 
court's proper dismissal of the Normans' breach of fiduciary duty claim, only two causes 
of action remained in their complaint, both of which sounded in contract. Because "the 
general rule is that punitive damages cannot be awarded for a breach of contract," 
however, the trial court properly dismissed this "claim" as well. Jorgensen v. John Clay 
and Co., 660 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1983). 
In an effort to get around the well-settled law, the Normans now argue that their 
complaint contains numerous examples of Arnold and Larson's egregious breaches of 
duty, and that punitive damages therefore are appropriate. (Appellants' Br. at 34-35.) 
Again, however, the alleged breach cannot create the duty, and the undisputed facts 
described above establish that Arnold owed the Normans no duty as a matter of law. 
Taking yet a further fall-back position, the Normans argue for the first time that 
Arnold owed the Normans a duty as a joint venture partner. (Appellants' Br. at 35.) This 
argument fails first, as demonstrated above, because the Normans cannot show that 
Arnold became a joint venture partner, nor that he undertook or agreed to any duties or 
obligations under the joint venture agreement. Second, even if that were not the case, the 
Normans have never sued Arnold for breach of fiduciary duty arising from a partner 
relationship. (R. 202-06.) They sued him only for breach of fiduciary duty arising from 
an alleged attorney-client relationship, and that claim proved defective on summary 
judgment. (Id.) Nor have the various other accusations in the Normans' appellate brief-
"conversion, theft, misrepresentation" - appeared at any time in their complaint. 
(Appellants' Br. at 35.) Each of these claims are separate and distinct causes of action, 
with unique elements, pleading requirements, and defenses. The Normans cannot raise 
these claims for the first on appeal. 
The Normans also rely on DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 
1983), for the proposition that contractual relationships do not preclude the possibility of 
causes of action sounding in tort, a point of law which Arnold concedes, as far as it goes. 
However, the argument that a relationship based on a contract can also give rise to claims 
for tort recovery between the parties to the contract in no way changes the fact that the 
Normans' complaint contained no tort claim when the trial court dismissed the breach of 
fiduciary claim. Nor does it change the fact that the law in Utah does not allow the 
recovery of punitive damages for breaches of contract - even where such breaches are 
malicious, intentional, or unjustified. Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica. Inc., 657 P.2d 
743, 750 (Utah 1982). Moreover, Peak Alarm did not involve an attempt by a plaintiff to 
impose liability for punitive damages arising out of a breach of a contract. Instead, this 
Court simply stated that "[a] party who breaches his duty of due care toward another may 
be found liable to the other in tort, even where the relationship giving rise to such a duty 
originates in a contract between the parties." Peak Alarm, 663 P.2d 433, 435. 
The Normans' punitive damages claim was properly dismissed, and should be 
upheld. 
F. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING THE NORMANS5 POST TRIAL MOTIONS FOR LEAVE 
TO AMEND, 
The Normans' final argument is that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing 
to allow them to amend their complaint after the parties had prepared for and appeared at 
trial. (Appellants' Br. at 36.) At oral argument on their motions, however, counsel for 
the Normans admitted that there wasn't "any question" that an appeal of the trial court's 
decision on this issue would be "futile": 
I think that if you don't grant our motion [to amend], . . . we 
couldn't get that reversed on appeal, because you certainly 
have discretion to deny it. I don't think there's any question 
about that, under the circumstances, and I think an appeal on 
that issue would be futile. 
(R. 1430;47:15-20.) 
As the Norman's counsel acknowledged, the trial court's discretion in denying a 
motion to amend - especially one made, as here, after the parties have prepared for trial -
is "broad." Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (leave to 
amend a pleading is within the "broad discretion" of the trial court and will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent "an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice" to the opposing 
party.) 
The Utah courts routinely deny motions for leave to amend which are made at or 
near the time of trial, as here. In Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983), 
overruled on other grounds by Meadowbrook v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 119 (Utah 1998), 
for example, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the district court's denial of the plaintiffs 
motion for leave to amend, observing that Rule 15 "is to be applied with less liberality 
when the amendments are proposed during or after trial. . . ." In denying leave, the 
supreme court specifically relied on the fact that "the motion to amend was not made 
until the day of trial, and it proposed to introduce new and different causes of action." Id, 
See also Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983) 
(stating that "we will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion to amend, made at the 
commencement of or during trial.") 
The Normans' motions to amend fall squarely within these cases. The Normans 
first raised the notion of amending their complaint on the morning of trial; the motions 
themselves did not materialize until the next month. (R. 971-72; R. 1019-20.) On the 
first day of trial, immediately after the trial court granted Arnold's motion in limine to 
exclude certain evidence as irrelevant to the Normans' claims for breach of the joint 
venture agreement and default of the trust deed note, counsel for the Normans stated: 
I have a couple of things I'd like to raise. One, I'd like to 
make the motion to be allowed to amend the pleadings. I'd 
like to assert, I mean, it never occurred to me to assert the 
Normans interest as to sue on behalf of the partnership, 
because its been clear to us that the partnership didn't care 
about the Norman's [sic] interest. But if that's the way that 
they need to do it, then I'd like to have permission to do that 
now. 
(R. 1432: 135:11-21) (emphasis added.) The sole reason the Normans did not move for 
leave to amend until the first day of trial was because it "never occurred" to them that at 
trial that they would have to establish - with relevant, competent evidence - the elements 
of the claims that actually existed in their complaint. As the trial court delicately 
observed in ruling on the motions to amend, 
And in this case, it seems to me that these facts were known 
earlier than right at trial, and . . . what is really placing the 
plaintiff in the bind is a failure to predict what the ruling 
would be on legal issues that the Court has made, and I think 
those might have been predicted better. 
(R. 1430: 48:22-49:2.) 
Moreover, the Normans incorrectly state in their brief that "[t]he sole basis for the 
denial of plaintiffs' motion to amend was that it had come 'too late' and would prejudice 
the defendants." (Appellants' Br. at 37.) This statement is flatly contradicted by the trial 
court's actual ruling. In denying the Normans' motions to amend, and in addition to 
finding that the motions were made "very late" in the process, the trial court also found 
that the facts "were known earlier than right at trial" and that the defendants would be 
exposed to additional, unnecessary expense "in preparing for trial with the expanded 
claims." (R. 1430: 48:17-49:5.) The trial court further found that there was "real doubt 
about the viability of [the Normans' proposed] claims," which he estimated as having a 
likelihood of success of "significantly less than 50 percent." (R. 1430: 49:6-10.) It is at 
best unclear how the trial court's refusal to allow futile claims could cause the Normans 
any "prejudice," a necessary finding before the trial court's ruling can be disturbed. 
Chadwick, supra, 763 P.2d at 820. The trial court's findings on each of the factors 
enumerated by this Court for the evaluation of motions to amend more than establish that 
it in no way abused its "broad discretion" in denying leave here. The trial court's denial 
of the Normans' post-trial motions to amend should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The Normans' arguments on appeal, like their arguments in opposition to Arnold's 
two motions for summary judgment, are based on highly disputed factual allegations 
concerning the breaches Arnold allegedly committed. The trial court appropriately 
ignored the disputed facts concerning the alleged breaches, and focused instead on the 
undisputed facts demonstrating conclusively that Arnold had no duty to breach. He was 
not a party to either of the agreements he is accused of breaching. Nor did he acquire 
fiduciary duties by undertaking to represent the Normans personally. Because of the 
absence of any duty under the contracts or the law, Arnold could not be liable for the 
Normans' losses. This fundamental and incurable infirmity also demonstrates why the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Normans leave to amend their 
complaint after the first day of trial. Accordingly, the trial court's decisions should be 
affirmed in every respect. 
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